“In cases where we've seen a pronounced disparity that sticks out like a sore thumb,” in risk from a borrower's investment and debt portfolio compared with other similar borrowers, analysts at Fitch Ratings now more thoroughly review borrowers' operating strength, says Fitch analyst Jeff Schaub. “It wouldn't change the rating in and of itself,” Schaub says. “But it could contribute to an overall negative rating profile that could result in a rating change.”
Eighteen months ago Fitch began to ask hospitals and health systems to disclose in greater detail investments that temporarily put cash out of reach, such as hedge funds, private equity or real estate, Schaub says. The ratings agency previously did so when borrowers' risk and cash reserves raised questions, but reporting is now more “standardized, rigorous and detailed,” he says.
Analysts have classified investments and request information on cash available from one to seven days; eight to 30 days; 31 days to 180 days and more than 180 days, he says.
Martin Arrick, managing director in corporate and government ratings at credit-rating agency Standard & Poor's, says questions analysts already asked intensified after unlikely risks became plausible during the credit crisis.
“It's not that we weren't cognizant” that alternative investments were less liquid or short-term bonds and swaps could abruptly drain cash off balance sheets, but suddenly such risks were “much more tangible,” he says.
Arrick says S&P also sees upcoming risk from short-term variable-rate bonds that require new commitments in the next two years from banks that guarantee borrowers' credit and access to cash. He notes borrowers have scaled back exposure from variable-rate bonds to less-risky fixed-rate debt. “Everybody is taking risk off the table, and there's more fixed-rate debt than there has been in the past,” he says. “I think people are moving more conservative all the way around.”
Moody's Investors Service in January introduced new liquidity measures for the 500 healthcare borrowers with roughly 2,000 hospitals that carry the agency's credit ratings. Moody's now requires from all borrowers information on eight investment types—or asset classes—including hedge funds; private equity and venture capital; and real estate—and whether investments can be cashed out within a month, a year or longer. Analysts use the breakout for four new measures of cash ready within a month or money available in a year to fund operations or meet obligations of debt that allows investors to swiftly exit and demand repayment (known as demand debt).
John Nelson, managing director of Moody's healthcare ratings team, says analysts previously calculated liquidity from financial statements, which do not break out investment restrictions on cash. Moody's previously sought additional detail on investment restrictions on a case-by-case basis, he says. Statements report unrestricted cash and investments together, even though it can take months or years to cash out alternatives versus a matter of days needed for fixed-income investments or equities.
“We could no longer rely on unrestricted cash and investments for a measure of liquidity,” Nelson says. “It was a measure of wealth, institutional wealth.”
Nelson attributes some of the liquidity risk during the credit crisis to hospitals' response after the last decade's first recession, which ended in November 2001 after eight months.
Healthcare investors emerged from the relatively mild 2001 recession to see portfolios depleted by equity volatility, Nelson says. As the economy recovered, fixed-income investments were less attractive and stock performance lagged behind hedge funds.
Hospitals began to consider hedge fund investment as a strategy to diversify risk and improve returns, he says. “I would say the logic is quite compelling if you did not value liquidity as a risk,” Nelson says. “That's where the fly in the ointment came to be.”
Alternative investments made up 18% of not-for-profit hospital and health system portfolios for the year ended in December 2008 compared with only 8% in 2003, according to the most recent yearly survey of portfolios by investment manager Commonfund, Wilton, Conn.
Many hospitals committed cash to alternative investments as they took on additional risk by borrowing in short-term markets debt that could be unloaded by investors for quick repayment, assuming bonds could be sold to new investors, Nelson says. Some used derivatives known as “swaps” as an interest-rate hedge for bonds in short-term markets.
But as the financial system faltered in 2008, healthcare borrowers' variable-rate bonds sold to short-term investors faced the risk that hospitals would be forced to hastily pay off those bonds should investors flee—a scenario considered unlikely before the crisis, but made real by bank distress and bondholder anxiety. The interest-rate hedges swung negative for healthcare borrowers, forcing many to post millions in collateral or pay fees to exit the deals. Negative swaps forced some major systems to make significant collateral postings. The Cleveland Clinic Health System was required to post $105 million in collateral while Catholic Health East, Newtown Square, Pa., posted $98 million.
Hospitals and systems have somewhat retreated from that risk, analysts say, and also have cut spending to boost cash reserves. Still, finance chiefs say alternatives—which also include commodities—continue to add much-needed diversity to portfolios.
Catholic Health Initiatives, Denver, temporarily withdrew about one-fifth of its hedge funds and poured the $115 million into short-term investments, says Linda MacDonald, vice president of treasury services at the system.
MacDonald, who oversees the 59-hospital system's $3.4 billion portfolio, says CHI “amassed liquidity” to guarantee the system had ready cash should jittery bondholders decide to flee during the worst of the credit crisis. The system returned the cash to hedge funds, she says, after market upheaval subsided and the system reduced its exposure to variable-rate demand bonds. She describes hedge funds as “not entirely liquid” but “not completely illiquid,” and the alternatives add portfolio diversity.
The system also “took a holiday” from new private-equity investments, MacDonald says. Private-equity managers, who lock in cash commitments that can be drawn on demand, have not yet invested previously obligated funds, she says.
Nonetheless, CHI decided not to change the ratio of investments in equities, fixed-income instruments and alternatives (43%, 37% and 20%, respectively) after a recent review of its strategy. The system might even reconsider real estate this year in markets where values have dropped to make such an investment attractive, MacDonald adds.
The system modeled weak performance from its portfolio and found risk and returns acceptable, she says. “We're not an organization that took a great deal of risk,” she says, but notes since the credit crisis “we may be slightly more conservative.” MacDonald says the system has also sought to more thoroughly consider risks from global events such as Europe's debt crisis.
Dean Swindle, who joined CHI as chief financial officer in May from nine-hospital Novant Health, Winston-Salem, N.C., says it would be hard not to emerge slightly more cautious from recent events.
“It does make you a little more cautious, more pragmatic, more methodical to ensure that you do feel comfortable,” Swindle says.